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A COUNTRY REORGANISED

DISPLACEMENT IN LEBANON SINCE 2 MARCH 2026

CORE GROUP

Date Issued: 13 May 2026

Prepared By: Core Group, Strategic Analysis Unit

I. KEY JUDGMENTS

KJ-01 HIGH CONFIDENCE

The displacement system has stabilised at one million displaced and 127,000 in formal shelter, and that stability is durable under current conditions. Three independent data feeds converge within 2 percent on the in-shelter caseload as of 13 May (127,563, 125,621, 126,900). The 88 percent gap between the in-shelter total and the national displaced count is the informal caseload, sitting in host families and rented rooms. Neither figure will move significantly without a change in the kinetic envelope, in the reconstruction-investment posture, or in the political conditions for return.

KJ-02 HIGH CONFIDENCE

The geographic redistribution has reorganised the country. Five southern cazas absorb the bulk of the conflict's building damage. Three of the five (Bent Jbeil, El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun) now host fewer than 300 of their own displaced in collective shelter. The population that fled these cazas sits in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the southern coastal cazas. The redistribution carries a sectarian and class dimension that the data does not directly measure but that the geography makes plain. A predominantly Shia population from rural agricultural zones now sits in mixed and majority-Sunni or Druze urban hosting cazas where it constitutes a minority.

KJ-03 HIGH CONFIDENCE

The shelter system is operating at the ceiling and cannot absorb a major re-displacement event. 411 of 630 collective shelters operate at 90 percent utilisation or higher as of 13 May. 77 operate above their nominal capacity. Beirut, Saida, Sour, and Jezzine sit at or over the ceiling. Only Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa carry residual capacity, together capable of absorbing perhaps 10,000 additional displaced. A re-displacement of the 30,000-individual magnitude observed in earlier cycles would force over-density compression or activation of new sites. Neither mechanism has been tested at scale since 16 April.

KJ-04 HIGH CONFIDENCE

The displaced population is younger than Lebanon's resident demography, and the regional variation runs along age rather than gender. Children under 18 carry 37 percent of the age-coded shelter caseload against a resident share near 31 percent. The female share runs at 52 percent of the sex-coded caseload, close to the resident share and tight across hosting regions. The substantive variation is in age, with North Lebanon, Akkar, and Mount

Lebanon hosting child shares above 40 percent and the South governorate hosting 31 percent. The displaced caseload everywhere is family-heavy. The geography varies how heavily.

KJ-05 HIGH CONFIDENCE

The April 17 ceasefire produced a single 30,700-person return wave, after which 16,000 re-displaced by 11 May. The 24-hour return is the largest one-day movement in the time series. The trajectory since traces three re-displacement spikes of 4,000 to 5,000 each, each correlated with a renewed strike wave at 24 to 72-hour lag. The current caseload sits 10 percent below the April peak and 14 percent above the post-ceasefire trough, with regional return rates that vary from 40 percent in Baalbek-El Hermel and the southern coast to zero in El Nabatieh and Bent Jbeil.

KJ-06 MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Return is conditioned on the survivability of the origin cadastre, not on the political status of the ceasefire. Where village structure survives, the post-17 April return moved population back. Where damage exceeds the threshold of habitable reoccupation, the displaced population has not returned. The deep-south cazas register zero return because their worst-affected cadastres carry damage rates that exceed the threshold of unaided reoccupation.

KJ-07 MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Aid delivery is concentrated in emergency food and lagging across the reconstruction sectors that would reverse displacement. Of $2,404 million committed and paid since 2 March, $501 million has been paid as of 13 May. Emergency food assistance carries a 60 percent paid share. Reconstruction relief, the largest commitment category, has paid 0.3 percent. Water and sanitation has paid 4.5 percent. The pattern mirrors prior conflict cycles and indicates that the current displacement system will hold at scale until reconstruction disbursement accelerates by an order of magnitude. — [CHART 1: Daily displaced population, March to May 2026]

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seventy-three days into the current conflict, Lebanon holds roughly **one million displaced people** as of 13 May 2026. Of these, **127,000 are registered in collective shelters**. The remaining nine-tenths are in host families, in rented rooms, or in informal arrangements that no agency tracks at scale. The displacement footprint reached a peak of **141,700 individuals on 16 April**, dropped by **30,700 in a single day** when the first ceasefire window opened on 17 April, and has

partly re-accumulated since. The country today sits 10 percent below the April peak and 14 percent above the post-ceasefire trough, in a steady-state that the strike record and the damage record together explain.

The geographic story is the part that matters most. The conflict has concentrated its damage in a handful of southern cazas, and in those cazas the population is gone. The displaced from these villages did not stay near them. They sit in **Beirut (49,520 registered on 13 May), Mount Lebanon (41,031), and the coastal South cazas of Saida and Sour (23,300)**. The deep south is functionally empty of its registered displaced. Bent Jbeil hosts 23 individuals in collective shelter against a population in five-digit thousands that originated there.

The shelter system that holds these 127,000 is structurally at the ceiling. Sixty-five percent of the 630 collective shelters operate above 90 percent utilisation, and 12 percent operate above their nominal capacity. **Beirut runs at 101 percent, Saida and Sour at 100 percent exactly, Jezzine at 100 percent.** Only Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa retain meaningful absorption headroom, together capable of taking perhaps 10,000 additional displaced before reaching the same ceiling. Re-displacement events of the magnitude observed in early May, 4,000 to 5,000 individuals in a single day, consume that buffer rapidly.

The displaced population skews younger and slightly more female than Lebanon's resident demography. Among individuals whose age is recorded, **children under 18 carry 37 percent of the in-shelter caseload**, against a resident share near 31 percent. Women carry **52 percent of those whose sex is recorded**, slightly above the resident share. The female share runs remarkably uniform across hosting regions, between 47 and 53 percent. The substantive regional variation is in age. North Lebanon, Akkar, and Mount Lebanon host child shares above 40 percent. The South governorate hosts the lowest at 31 percent. Vulnerability indicators, including pregnancy, lactation, and disability, concentrate in the Bekaa and Akkar.

The aid envelope is structurally mismatched to the displacement it nominally addresses. **$2.4 billion has been committed or paid since 2 March**, of which **$501 million has actually been paid**. Emergency food moves at a 60 percent paid share. Reconstruction relief, the largest single commitment category at $657 million, has paid out $1.7 million. The aid that holds the displaced caseload alive at the shelter is flowing. The aid that would reverse the displacement by reconstructing origin cadastres is not.

What the data shows is a displacement system that has stabilised at a configuration the underlying conditions point to as durable. The April peak was the high-water mark of outbound flow under the active strike envelope. The April 17 return wave was a single-day phenomenon. The 127,000 sustained in shelter since late April, and the one million sustained in host families and informal hosting, is the floor that the strike record produces under the present ceasefire configuration. It does not represent the resolution of displacement. It represents the population that cannot return.

III. THE AGGREGATE SCALE OF DISPLACEMENT

The official headline reads one million displaced. The shelter system holds one in ten of them. The remaining nine-tenths sit in host families, in rented rooms, and in arrangements that no agency tracks at the household level. This composition is the report's central structural fact and the framing for everything that follows.

Three measurements of the displaced population exist in the public record. The Ministry of Social Affairs counts individuals inside the 630 collective shelters it monitors. That count stands at **127,563 on 13 May**. United Nations agencies restate the same in-shelter figure on a weekly cadence. Their latest reading is **125,621 on 6 May**. The national displacement estimate, which adds an administrative multiplier for host-family and informal hosting, reads **126,900 on 11 May**. The three figures converge within 2 percent of each other because they are measuring overlapping but related slices of the same population, all anchored to the in-shelter monitoring backbone.

The number that sits outside this convergence is the one that matters for understanding displacement in Lebanon. UNRWA's 5 May situation report restates the national displaced count at **1,100,000 individuals**, drawing on Ministry of Social Affairs administrative records that capture self-registered displacement in addition to in-shelter caseload. Subtracting the 124,000 in collective shelter and the 1,100 in UNRWA-managed shelter leaves **974,000 individuals**, **88.6 percent of the displaced**, in host families, informal hosting, and arrangements the system does not see directly.

Chart 8. Where the one million displaced actually sit



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

This 88 percent informal share is not a transient feature of an emerging displacement event. It is the structural feature of Lebanese displacement absorption. The 2024 conflict cycle produced a similar pattern, with host families and rental markets absorbing between 85 and 90 percent of the total displaced caseload at every observation point. Two consequences follow. First, the collective shelter system does not measure displacement. It measures the residual caseload that has no kinship or financial access to informal hosting. Second, the displacement system is more exposed to second-order shocks than the headline shelter number suggests. A

rental-market compression, a host-family financial squeeze, or a kinetic event affecting hosting cazas would push the informal caseload back into the formal shelter system, which has no residual capacity to receive it.

Table 1. Inflection points in the displacement trajectory, March to May 2026.

Date	National displaced	Note
9 March	120,000	First observation, one week into the conflict
27 March	137,000	First plateau established
10 April	140,000	Late pre-ceasefire intensification begins
16 April	**141,700**	**Peak. Ceasefire enters force the same evening**
17 April	111,000	**Single-day return of 30,700**
22 April	121,100	First re-displacement wave (+10,100)
27 April	115,000	Partial reduction under ceasefire fragility
4 May	124,500	Re-displacement following 2-3 May strike wave
11 May	126,900	Latest observation

The trajectory in Table 1 tells a story of stabilisation under stress. Displacement climbed steadily through March under the active strike envelope. It plateaued in the second half of March as initial flows exhausted, and re-accelerated through early April. The peak of 141,700 on 16 April coincided with the heaviest single-week strike intensification of the cycle. The ceasefire on the same date triggered a one-day return movement of unmatched scale. The subsequent climb back to 127,000 traces the population that was re-displaced under continued strike pressure inside the post-ceasefire window. The net position carries the underlying message of the report. Outbound displacement is the floor, not the ceiling.

Map 2. Origin geography: where homes were destroyed



Top 6 origin cazas by damage

Buildings moderately to severely damaged

1	Marjaayoun	3,890	6.2% of stock
2	Bent Jbeil	3,445	5.3% of stock
3	Sour	1,656	0.8% of stock
4	Saida	779	0.6% of stock
5	Baabda	751	0.7% of stock
6	El Nabatieh	622	0.7% of stock

Total damaged: 11,821 buildings

Across 941K assessed in conflict-affected adm2s

Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

IV. THE ORIGIN OF DISPLACEMENT

The country's displacement starts where its buildings were destroyed. The May 8 Core Group damage assessment quantified the cumulative position at the end of April, finding **12,188 buildings moderately to severely damaged** across the three conflict-affected regions, with damage heavily concentrated in two southern cazas. Marjaayoun and Bent Jbeil together account for **60 percent of all moderate-or-worse damage** despite hosting only 14 percent of the assessed building stock. Inside those two cazas, the worst-affected villages carry damage rates of 30 to 60 percent of buildings. The geographic asymmetry of the destruction is the geographic asymmetry of the displacement that followed.

Map 3. The deep south at cadastre resolution



Worst-damaged cadastres

Buildings damaged, share of stock

1	Aitaroun	963	**33%**
2	Meiss el Jabal	819	**21%**
3	Bent Jbayl	802	**24%**
4	Taybet Matjaayoun	737	**33%**
5	Khiyam Marjaayoun	637	**11%**
6	Houla	347	**19%**
7	Aita ash Shaab	331	**17%**
8	Beit Lif	294	**60%**

Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

For displacement purposes, the relevant detail is not the totals but the threshold. A cadastre with a 5 percent damage rate carries displaced households that can return and rebuild around a damaged minority of structures. A cadastre with a 30 percent damage rate cannot. The deep-south cluster sits decisively on the second side of that threshold. The reverse pattern holds in Sour and Saida, which together register 2,400 damaged buildings but at low percentage rates of 0.85 and 0.63 percent. The damage in those cazas concentrates in inland and peri-urban cadastres rather than in the coastal cores. The urban infrastructure that supports collective shelter, hospitals, schools, and the rental market remains intact. This explains why Sour and Saida absorb their own displaced at the volumes the destination map shows, while Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun do not.

The Bekaa-belt cazas and the dahieh suburbs of southern Beirut produce smaller-volume origin signals operating on the same logic. The Bekaa damage is sparser and concentrated along the eastern border belt, and the displaced from those cazas have moved primarily to interior

Bekaa towns and Mount Lebanon. The dahieh evacuated in earlier waves under area pressure and has not returned at scale, though the limited current strike pattern against the dahieh, which targets senior figures rather than producing area damage, does not push additional outbound flow.

The May 8 assessment captured the cumulative position at the end of April. The strike record between 29 April and 13 May 2026 adds further damage that the next assessment will quantify. The direction of travel is not in doubt. Full cadastre-level damage figures, including the village-by-village breakdown that anchors Map 3, are documented in SF-LBN-DMG-2026-05.

Map 1. Destination geography of the displaced



Top 8 IDP-receiving cazas

1	Beirut	49,520	101% util
2	Saida	18,646	100% util
3	Chouf	12,445	88% util
4	Aley	9,894	78% util
5	Baabda	7,813	100% util
6	El Meten	6,242	90% util
7	Sour	4,630	100% util
8	Jbeil	2,511	83% util

Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

V. THE DESTINATION OF DISPLACEMENT

The displaced went north and west. Eight cazas absorb 80 percent of the registered shelter caseload, with the concentration peaking in **Beirut at 49,520 individuals across 138 collective shelter sites** as of 13 May. The geographic pattern reverses the origin map. The cazas that emptied are the cazas the displaced left, and the cazas that filled are the country's hosting backbone.

Table 2. Top ten host cazas, registered shelter population 13 May 2026.

Caza	Governorate	Shelter sites	Registered IDPs	Utilisation
Beirut	Beirut	138	49,520	101.3%
Saida	South	54	18,646	100.0%
Chouf	Mount Lebanon	73	12,445	88.5%
Aley	Mount Lebanon	55	9,894	78.0%
Baabda	Mount Lebanon	28	7,813	99.6%
El Meten	Mount Lebanon	35	6,242	90.1%
Sour	South	17	4,630	100.0%
Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	41	2,511	82.7%
Jezzine	South	17	2,380	100.0%
Kesrwane	Mount Lebanon	21	2,193	79.4%

The Beirut concentration carries the heaviest hosting load in the country and operates at the ceiling. The 138 shelter sites inside Beirut municipality hold 49,520 individuals against a nominal capacity of 48,872, with **59 of the 138 sites (43 percent) operating above nominal capacity**. The flow into Beirut combined three converging streams. The dahieh population that relocated to central Beirut after earlier-cycle evacuations did not return. Deep-south displaced who passed through Mount Lebanon arrived in Beirut for proximity to aid distribution and pre-existing family networks. A Saida-northbound flow reached Beirut when southern coastal hosting saturated.

Map 5. The per-capita absorption load



Highest hosting load

IDPs per 1,000 residents

1	Beirut	142/1,000
2	Saida	56/1,000
3	Chouf	54/1,000
4	Jezzine	48/1,000
5	Aley	31/1,000
6	Jbeil	23/1,000

Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

The per-capita view sharpens the picture. **Beirut hosts 142 displaced individuals per 1,000 residents**, a per-capita absorption load 2.5 times higher than the next-heaviest caza. Saida runs at 56 per 1,000. The Mount Lebanon cazas of Chouf, Jezzine, and Aley each carry between 30 and 55 per 1,000. The deep-south cazas of Bent Jbeil and El Nabatieh appear at near zero on this map, because the populations that would constitute the denominator have left.

Mount Lebanon is the country's absorption layer. Its 253 collective shelters hold 41,031 individuals at 87 percent utilisation as of 13 May, the lowest of any major hosting governorate, and the only one with meaningful residual headroom. Approximately 6,200 individuals can still be absorbed at the current utilisation curve, and another 4,000 at a notional 95 percent ceiling. The 10,000 total is the buffer the Lebanese formal shelter system carries against further re-displacement. It is smaller than two of the three re-displacement waves the trajectory has already produced.

The southern coastal absorption follows a different logic. Saida, Sour, and Jezzine together hold 25,656 individuals across 88 sites at exactly 100 percent utilisation. The three cazas have no residual capacity. Their absorption is the regional hosting layer for the deep-south displaced who did not cross into Mount Lebanon, and the limit is structural. The urban infrastructure of the coastal South can sustain the current caseload but cannot expand to meet a re-displacement event without external site activation.

The displaced who are not in collective shelter follow a different geography. Host-family absorption concentrates in Beirut, in coastal Mount Lebanon, and in Zahle and the western Bekaa, with smaller fractions in the North and Akkar. The Lebanese kinship system has absorbed displacement at scale through three successive conflict cycles. It is doing so again, at the same 85 to 90 percent share, with the same operational invisibility. The host-family arrangements that hold 974,000 individuals depend on three contingent variables that the formal shelter system does not. Host households must retain physical capacity, financial capacity, and willingness to continue absorbing. The first variable is geographic. The second is connected to the Lebanese economic situation and to remittances that have softened through 2024 and 2025. The third is political and conditional on the duration of the displacement. None of the three is unlimited, and the rental-market compression visible in central Beirut since the April peak indicates that the financial-capacity dimension is already under pressure.

VI. THE SHELTER SYSTEM AT THE CEILING

The Lebanese formal shelter system holds the residual 12 percent of the displaced population that has no host family, no kinship network, and no financial access to informal hosting. The 630 collective shelter sites distributed across the country are the country’s displacement absorption layer of last resort, and they are operating at the structural limit.

Map 4. The collective shelter network and capacity stress



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

Sixty-five percent of shelter sites operate at 90 percent utilisation or higher as of 13 May. Twelve percent operate above their nominal capacity, holding 28,500 individuals against a 24,700 ceiling, a 15 percent average overshoot. The condition is administrative. Shelter managers continue to register the additional individuals, accepting reduced per-person square-metre allocation, floor sleeping, and shared room compression. The condition is also geographic, and the geography matters.

Chart 5. Shelter capacity stress, top 15 host cazas



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

Beirut is the most over-stressed system in the country. **138 sites at 101 percent utilisation, 59 of them above 100 percent, a nominal capacity of 48,872 holding 49,520.** The Beirut overshoot is structural rather than transient. The 49,520 figure has held within 1,500 individuals of itself for three consecutive weeks. The capital is full.

The southern coastal cazas of Saida, Sour, and Jezzine operate at exactly 100 percent across their 88 sites. None of the three carries surplus headroom. A re-displacement event from the deep south of even 5,000 individuals would have nowhere to go inside the South governorate. The displaced would either move further north to Mount Lebanon, accept over-density compression at existing sites, or be absorbed informally by host families that may themselves be at capacity.

Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa are the system's residual buffers. Mount Lebanon's 253 sites hold 41,031 at 87 percent utilisation. The Bekaa's 56 sites hold 4,080 at 84 percent. Together they can absorb perhaps 10,000 additional displaced before reaching the same ceiling. The 10,000 figure is the country's strategic reserve against further re-displacement, and it sits below the magnitude of two of the three re-displacement events that have occurred since 17 April.

The UNRWA-managed shelter system operates in parallel to the Lebanese formal network. Twelve refugee camps and their adjacent installations hold the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) population. The displaced PRL caseload sitting inside UNRWA shelter peaked at 1,892 on 25 March, declined through April under the same ceasefire-return dynamics as the Lebanese caseload, and currently stands at 1,132 individuals across 328 families on 5 May. Cross-demographic hosting, where Lebanese displaced shelter inside Palestinian camps under acute crisis, is not visible in the data at meaningful scale. The structural relationship is the opposite. PRL displaced from camps under strike pressure or adjacent kinetic activity move into UNRWA-managed adjacent space, while the Lebanese population displaced from the same cadastres

moves into Ministry-managed collective shelter. The two systems hold different populations from overlapping geographies.

The Lebanese formal shelter system holds 124,000. UNRWA holds 1,100. Everything else, 974,000 individuals, sits in arrangements the displacement response does not track at the household level. The formal shelter system is one-tenth of the displacement system as a whole. The operationally consequential decisions about the displaced majority, covering income support, child-protection programming, education continuity, and household-level food security, take place outside the formal system entirely.

VII. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE DISPLACED

The displaced population that the shelter system holds is structurally different from the Lebanese resident population. It is younger, with a higher concentration of children. It is slightly more female on average. It carries higher rates of disability, pregnancy, and lactation. It sits in households of slightly smaller average size than Lebanon's resident population. These compositional differences are not artefacts of registration bias. They are the demographic signature of a displacement event that the deep-south and Bekaa-belt cadastres produced.

Chart 3. Age and sex composition of the displaced



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

Among individuals whose age is recorded, **children under 18 carry 37 percent of the in-shelter caseload**, against a Lebanese resident share near 31 percent. The shift reflects three convergent pressures. Families with school-age children evacuated at higher rates because schools closed and child-protection considerations dominated the household decision. Working-age men returned to or remained at origin cazas for property protection and informal labour. The oldest cohort, 58 and above, evacuated more slowly and partly remained at origin, producing a 12 percent elderly share in shelter against the resident 15 percent. All three pressures push

the in-shelter age structure younger. The 6-percentage-point shift in the under-18 share is the aggregate result.

The female share runs at **52 percent of the sex-coded caseload**, close to the 51 percent resident share. The figure runs remarkably uniform across hosting regions, with most governorates falling between 50 and 53 percent. El Nabatieh is the single outlier at 47 percent, the only male-leaning host in the country, and that figure rests on a small in-shelter caseload of 957 individuals.

Map 6. Female share of the registered displaced, by caza



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

The substantive regional variation runs along age rather than gender. The picture is bimodal across host regions in a way the female share is not.

Table 3. Demographic profile of the registered displaced, by governorate.

Governorate	Registered IDPs	Female share	Children (<18) share	Elderly (58+) share	Avg family size
Beirut	49,520	50.9%	35.9%	12.8%	4.03
Mount Lebanon	41,031	52.8%	40.7%	11.6%	3.74
South	25,656	52.3%	31.5%	10.5%	3.74
North	5,083	51.6%	42.3%	10.1%	3.94
Bekaa	4,080	51.2%	38.2%	12.1%	3.90
Akkar	1,236	51.2%	41.5%	8.9%	3.68
El Nabatieh	957	47.3%	39.8%	13.9%	3.99

Chart 4. Demographic shares across host governorates



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

North Lebanon (42 percent), Akkar (42 percent), Mount Lebanon (41 percent), and El Nabatieh (40 percent) host child shares above 40 percent. The South governorate hosts the lowest at 31 percent. Beirut sits in the middle at 36 percent. The interpretation runs along destination logic rather than sectarian or class logic. Where the displaced concentrated in rural and peri-urban hosting cazas, the arriving household composition is younger and family-complete. Where the displaced concentrated in the urban South governorate and the capital, the household composition skews toward working-age adults and the elderly. Both flows reflect family relocation, but the destination determines who arrives.

The pattern has operational consequences that the aggregate share conceals. Akkar's 1,236-person caseload at 42 percent child share holds 519 individuals under 18 inside a single governorate with only 22 collective shelter sites, a per-site average that exceeds the country's median. The North's 5,083 at 42 percent child share holds 2,150 individuals under 18 across 61 sites. These are the cazas where the in-shelter caseload is small in absolute terms but child-heavy in composition. The South's larger 25,656-person caseload at 31 percent child share

holds 8,080 individuals under 18, which is a larger absolute number but in a hosting system that runs at 100 percent utilisation with no headroom for child-specific space allocation.

The vulnerability indicators concentrate in the Bekaa-belt and Akkar host caseloads. **782 pregnant women and 1,050 lactating women** are registered in collective shelter, together close to 4 percent of the female caseload, with the highest density in Bekaa and Akkar. The disability share, 1.9 percent of the in-shelter population, runs above the national average in the Bekaa and Akkar and below it in Beirut and the South. The protection and health-programming consequence is geographically asymmetric. The Bekaa and Akkar are the higher-density vulnerability zones. Beirut and the South carry larger absolute caseloads but lower per-shelter vulnerability indices.

Two demographic dimensions sit outside the data feeds. Sectarian composition is not recorded at the registration level. Pre-conflict household income is not captured at all. Both are central to the demographic-shift question. The geographic redistribution speaks to both indirectly. A predominantly Shia population from rural agricultural cazas in the deep south and the Bekaa border belt, plus a Shia-majority dahieh population, now sits in mixed and majority-Sunni or Druze cazas of Beirut, the Chouf, Aley, Saida, and Tripoli. The displaced population is a minority by sect and by class in most of the cazas now hosting it. This is not a transient evacuation pattern. It is a redistribution that the current data anchors as durable for as long as the in-shelter caseload holds.

The class dimension carries consequences the sect dimension does not. The displaced from the agricultural cazas of the deep south carry agricultural livelihoods that have no obvious analogue in Beirut or Mount Lebanon. Small trade, animal husbandry, and seasonal farming labour do not transfer to urban hosting environments. The displaced households that have moved into Beirut and central Mount Lebanon depend either on remittances, on accumulated savings, on informal aid distribution, or on income drawn from male family members who returned to origin zones for property protection and what informal income those zones still produce. Each of these income channels carries a finite horizon. The income horizon is not measurable in the displacement record, but it is the structural variable that determines how long the current configuration can hold.

VIII. THE APRIL 17 RETURN AND WHAT CAME AFTER

The ceasefire that took force on the evening of 16 April produced the single most consequential one-day movement in the displacement record. National displaced fell from 141,700 to 111,000 in 24 hours. The 30,700-person return was larger than any single-day movement in either direction across the 73-day period. It tested the proposition that the displacement was, in operational terms, conditional on the active strike envelope.

Chart 6. The April 17 return and the re-displacement that followed



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

The proposition held in some places and failed in others. The Baalbek-El Hermel governorate registered a 40 percent reduction in shelter occupancy within the first week of the ceasefire. The southern coastal cazas of Sour and Saida together registered the same. The Bekaa registered 25 percent. Mount Lebanon registered 10 percent. Beirut registered 5 percent. The El Nabatieh and Bent Jbeil cazas registered, between them, essentially zero. The pattern is structured by one variable, the survivability of the origin cadastre.

Table 4. Return after the April 16 ceasefire, by region.

Region	Shelter pop. change	Interpretation
Baalbek-El Hermel	-40%	Strong return where strike pressure abated
South (Sour, Saida coastal)	-40%	Return to coastal cazas with intact infrastructure
Bekaa	-25%	Partial return, sustained shelter base
Mount Lebanon	-10%	Limited return outflow, remained hosting hub
Beirut	-5%	Minimal return, dahieh population deferred
El Nabatieh	0%	Near-zero return, village destruction blocks reoccupation
Bent Jbeil (deep south)	0%	Uninhabitable, UXO and continued strike pressure

Map 7. The geography of who returned



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

Where the May 8 damage assessment showed surviving village structure, return moved population back. Where damage exceeded the threshold of habitable reoccupation, return did not occur. Return is a function of physical reoccupation feasibility rather than a function of ceasefire

political status. The Baalbek-El Hermel pattern of 40 percent return reflects a building damage rate below 1 percent across the assessed cohort. The El Nabatieh zero-return reflects cadastre-level damage rates in the double digits across the worst-hit villages.

Re-displacement followed. Between 17 April and 11 May, three single-day re-displacement spikes register above 4,000 individuals each. **20 April produced +5,400. 1 May produced +4,500. 4 May produced +5,000.** Each corresponds to identifiable kinetic activity. The 20 April spike followed sustained post-ceasefire strikes in the deep south. The 1 May spike followed renewed strike activity around the 27 April low. The 4 May spike followed the 2-3 May Bent Jbeil strike wave that hit six frontline cadastres in 36 hours. The lag between strike date and re-displacement registration runs at 24 to 72 hours, consistent with how the displacement registration system processes new arrivals.

The cumulative re-displacement of 16,000 individuals between the 17 April trough and the 11 May reading sits inside the same shelter system that held the pre-ceasefire 141,700. The composition has shifted toward the harder cases. The first wave of post-ceasefire returnees included households whose origin cadastres remained reoccupiable. The population that did not return, and the population that re-displaced, includes a higher concentration of households from the worst-damaged cadastres. The shelter caseload at 127,000 on 13 May is not the same 127,000 that occupied the same shelters in late March. The aggregate is steady. The structural composition has hardened.

The conditional likelihood of further movement carries three branches over the next 30 to 90 days. Under the **MOST LIKELY PATH**, kinetic activity remains at the post-ceasefire compressed level the record currently captures, and the in-shelter caseload holds at 125,000 to 130,000. Marginal regional rebalancing continues as Mount Lebanon's residual capacity absorbs further re-displacement from the deep south. Under a **LOWER LIKELIHOOD** path, a second ceasefire extension produces a further return wave of 5,000 to 10,000 individuals, primarily out of the Bekaa and the southern coastal absorption layer rather than out of the deep-south cazas where return is blocked. Under a separate **LOWER LIKELIHOOD** path running the opposite direction, strike re-intensification triggers a re-displacement event of 10,000 to 20,000 into the Mount Lebanon residual headroom, pushing the in-shelter caseload back above 140,000. Under the **LOWEST LIKELIHOOD** path, displacement reduces toward pre-conflict levels below 30,000. This requires conditions, including sustained ceasefire over 90 days and origin-area reconstruction at scale, that the current data does not show developing.

IX. AID AGAINST NEED

The financial response to the displacement carries the same structural mismatch as the shelter response. Aid is flowing where it sustains the displaced caseload alive at the shelter. Aid is not flowing where it would reverse the displacement.



Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, UN agencies, OCHA FTS, IATI Datastore, geolocated air-strike record. See appendix for details. | Core Group | 13 May 2026

Since 2 March, **$2,404 million has been committed or paid** across 1,389 transactions captured by international tracking systems. Of this, **$501 million has been paid** as of 13 May, a 20.8 percent paid share. The aggregate disguises sectoral pattern.

Table 5. Aid by sector, committed against paid.

Sector	Total $(M)\|Paid$(M)	Paid share	
Reconstruction relief	657	1.7	0.3%
Water supply and sanitation	207	9.3	4.5%
Civilian peace-building	108	2.6	2.4%
Emergency food assistance	117	70.3	60.3%
Security system management	76	0.0	0.0%
Food security and logistics	67	67.3	100.0%
Early recovery and protection	47	46.8	99.6%

Emergency food assistance and the closely related food-security category together flow at near-complete paid share. Together they total $184 million in commitments with $138 million paid. The aid that holds the displaced caseload alive at the meal level is operating. The displaced are eating.

Reconstruction relief is the inverse. $657 million committed, $1.7 million paid, a 0.3 percent paid share. The reconstruction-sector commitment is the largest single category in the aid envelope. It is also the sector category with the lowest disbursement rate. Water supply and sanitation, at $207 million committed and 4.5 percent paid, follows the same pattern. These are the sectors where investment would reverse displacement by reconstructing or rehabilitating the cadastres of origin. They are not flowing.

The order of magnitude that matters is large. Reversing displacement from Marjaayoun, Bent Jbeil, and the worst-affected El Nabatieh cadastres requires reconstructing approximately 7,300 buildings at the moderate-or-worse damage tier, plus 1,281 buildings classified as severely damaged. International reconstruction cost benchmarks for the Lebanese context place the per-building reconstruction cost between $20,000 and $80,000 depending on damage tier and pre-conflict construction type, implying a credible reconstruction budget for the deep-south cohort alone of $300 million to $600 million. The currently committed but unpaid reconstruction envelope of $655 million sits in the same order of magnitude, suggesting that the financing exists at pledge level. It has not flowed. The constraint is disbursement, not commitment.

The donor concentration is heavy at the top. The United Nations Development Programme accounts for $1,370 million of total commitments, of which $3 million has been paid. UNICEF accounts for $430 million across 868 transactions, of which $91 million has been paid. The World Food Programme accounts for $136 million with $81 million paid. Among bilateral state donors, Japan has paid $117 million, Germany $7 million, the United Kingdom $15 million, and Canada $14 million. The pattern at the donor level mirrors the sectoral pattern. Multilateral reconstruction commitments accumulate without disbursement. Smaller emergency-response disbursements actually move.

The funding gap that matters for displacement reversal is not the headline gap between $2,404 million committed and $501 million paid. It is the sectoral gap between $655 million in unpaid reconstruction and $1.7 million paid, between $198 million in unpaid water-sanitation and $9 million paid. The aid record, in other words, anticipates the structural condition the report has described. The current displacement system is durable not despite the aid envelope but in part because of how the aid envelope is structured. Short-cycle response keeps the displaced alive in place. Long-cycle reconstruction that would reverse the displacement has not begun.

X. SYNTHESIS

The displacement system that has emerged in the 73 days since 2 March 2026 has stabilised at a configuration that the underlying conditions point to as durable. Eight assessments anchor that stabilisation and project forward across the next 30 to 90 days.

Assessment 1 HIGH CONFIDENCE

The current 127,000-in-shelter caseload is the floor under the present ceasefire configuration. It is sustained by continued kinetic activity below the pre-ceasefire intensity but above zero, by the non-return condition in El Nabatieh and Bent Jbeil, and by the absence of origin-area reconstruction investment. The caseload will rise under further strike intensification and will not fall meaningfully without one or more of three conditions. Sustained ceasefire over 90 days. Reconstruction investment at scale. Administrative permissions for return that the current geometry precludes.

Assessment 2

HIGH CONFIDENCE

The geographic redistribution is the longer-running consequence than the in-shelter caseload. The deep-south population that has moved to Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the southern coastal cazas is sitting in cazas where it is a sectarian and economic minority, with informal economic networks that have not transferred from origin. The redistribution will persist past the resolution of the in-shelter caseload because the host-family arrangements that absorb 88 percent of the displaced operate on kinship and rental-market logic that does not produce automatic return, the cazas of origin in the deep south require reconstruction that is not occurring, and the displaced population includes school-age children whose education trajectory will increasingly anchor to host-area schools.

Assessment 3

HIGH CONFIDENCE

The shelter system at current capacity cannot absorb a re-displacement event larger than 10,000 to 12,000 individuals without forcing over-density compression or new-site activation. The two governorates with residual headroom (Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa) carry the absorption buffer. The four others sit at or over the ceiling. The buffer is smaller than two of the three re-displacement events the trajectory has already produced. A new event of comparable magnitude would force displaced individuals into informal arrangements that the system does not see, increasing the share of the displaced population outside the formal response.

Assessment 4

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

The 88 percent informal-caseload share is the part of the displacement system most exposed to political-economic shock. The host-family arrangements depend on the financial and physical capacity of host households, on rental-market stability, and on continued informal aid flows. A second-order shock to any of these would displace the displaced a second time, this time out of host families and into a formal shelter system that has no residual capacity to absorb them. The aid envelope's emphasis on emergency food addresses the immediate caseload but does not address the rental-market or financial-capacity dimensions that sustain the informal absorption.

Assessment 5

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

The geography of displacement shows a uniformly female-majority caseload at 51 to 53 percent across hosting regions, against a meaningful regional variation in child share that runs from 31 percent in the South to 42 percent in the rural North. The pattern indicates that whole-family relocation is the dominant displacement architecture everywhere, but that destinations

sort by household composition. Urban hosting (Beirut, Saida) draws more working-age adults and elderly. Rural hosting (Akkar, Bekaa, the North) draws younger households with more children. The protection and education-programming implications run along the child-share axis rather than along a gendered fragmentation axis.

Assessment 6

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Return is conditioned on the physical survivability of the origin cadastre rather than on the political status of the ceasefire. The El Nabatieh and Bent Jbeil zero-return rate is the strongest data anchor for this judgment. The Baalbek-El Hermel 40 percent return rate, where damage clusters are sparser, anchors the opposite end. Where village structure survives, the displaced returned within days of the 17 April ceasefire. Where damage rates cross the 20 percent threshold, return did not occur and will not occur without prior reconstruction investment. The political status of the ceasefire matters operationally as the condition that permits return. It is not the variable that determines who returns.

Assessment 7

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

The aid envelope's structural imbalance is not a transient feature of the 73-day window. The same pattern was visible in the 2024 conflict cycle, where reconstruction commitments accumulated at pledge scale and disbursed at a fraction of that pace over the subsequent two years. The current 127,000 in shelter and one million in informal hosting will not reduce significantly until reconstruction disbursement accelerates by an order of magnitude or kinetic conditions in origin cadastres resolve sufficiently to permit return into reduced infrastructure. Neither condition is visible in the current data.

Assessment 8

LOW CONFIDENCE

The cross-sectarian, cross-class, and cross-regional dimensions of the demographic redistribution will produce second-order political consequences inside the hosting cazas. Host-population reception capacity has not been tested at the scale of the current absorption. Intra-Lebanese friction indicators around rental markets, political-party constituencies, sectarian-balance shifts in mixed cazas, and electoral-register implications for the 2026-2027 cycle are not captured in the displacement data feeds. The structural pattern is clear. The operational consequences are not directly measurable from the displacement record alone. The assessment carries low confidence because the second-order political effects depend on contingent local political dynamics that the data does not anchor.

XI. APPENDIX A. METHODOLOGY AND DATA NOTES

This report draws on a curated data bundle assembled on 13 May 2026 covering displacement-relevant feeds since 2 March 2026. The principal sources are the Ministry of Social Affairs site-monitoring system, the Disaster Risk Management Dashboard backbone restated through UN agency situation reports, the United Nations Development Programme's national displacement estimate, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency situation reports on the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon caseload, the OCHA Financial Tracking Service and the IATI Datastore for aid flows, and a geolocated record of Israeli air strikes against Lebanese territory. The cadastre-level building damage assessment referenced in Section II and rendered in Map 3 is drawn from the May 8 Core Group damage assessment (SF-LBN-DMG-2026-05).

Several methodological qualifications apply.

The Ministry of Social Affairs site-monitoring record is a daily snapshot rather than a per-site time series. National daily aggregates are reconstructed from sequential snapshots in the cross-source triangulation series. Per-site trajectories cannot be derived. Age-band coding covers approximately 87 percent of the in-shelter caseload, and sex coding covers 86 percent. Demographic shares in Section V and the supporting tables are computed against the age-coded or sex-coded subset as appropriate, with the denominator noted in the relevant tables and prose.

UN agency situation reports 1 through 20 do not carry the in-shelter caseload field. Only sitreps 21 through 23 carry it. Pre-April in-shelter analysis relies on the Ministry of Social Affairs aggregation and on OCHA flash reporting, both of which restate the same Disaster Risk Management Dashboard backbone.

International Organisation for Migration district-level mobility data is access-restricted and not available in the bundle. Caza-level reconstruction of displacement movements relies on Ministry of Social Affairs aggregation.

The UNRWA auto-discovery feed is unusable in the current bundle. The 10 sitreps used here are from a manually-archived collection covering UNRWA-managed shelter caseload of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. The 470,000 registered-PRL national figure is referenced from UNRWA's general population register and is not from this report's primary feeds.

The geolocated air-strike record captures 3,970 strikes between 2 March and 13 May 2026 with explicit latitude and longitude at ingestion. The pipeline's effective recall against a corroborating reference set runs at 67.8 percent within 24 hours of event time and 86.7 percent within 120 hours. Five rows in the raw bundle carry forward-projected dates that read as data-entry errors and are excluded from the filtered set used here.

The cadastre-level damage assessment (Section II) uses the May 8 Core Group consensus methodology, which combines two independent satellite change-detection bands at the cadastre level with a verification cross-check. The methodology is documented in SF-LBN-DMG-2026-05 (annex A2).

Aid-flow figures from OCHA FTS and IATI Datastore use the committed-versus-paid distinction taken from the source feeds. IATI uses DAC sector codes. OCHA-FTS uses category names. Cross-source sector consolidation in Table 5 maps DAC codes to readable labels.

Origin-destination analysis in Sections II and III uses the cadastre-level damage assessment as the origin proxy and the shelter-system geography as the destination. The cross-tabulation is structural inference rather than direct measurement. The shelter-system record carries destination geography (governorate, district, village, latitude, longitude) but no origin field.

Caza-population denominators in Map 5 use approximate caza resident populations derived from the 2017 Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics census and UNDP rebasing. The figures carry plus-or-minus 10 to 20 percent measurement uncertainty against current Lebanese resident population. Intended use is for relative comparison across cazas.

The ReliefWeb discovery feed is configured but not populated at this report's date. UNDP, ACAPS, REACH, and Protection cluster PDFs that would otherwise be indexed through ReliefWeb are not in the dataset. The analytical material that would draw on those feeds is more limited than future iterations of this report could expect.

The analytical pipeline that produced this report is reproducible against the same input bundle. Output data tables, figures, and the build pipeline are archived alongside the report.

XII. APPENDIX B. SOURCES

Displacement registration and shelter monitoring. Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs, Site Monitoring system, 630 collective shelter records refreshed daily. Disaster Risk Management Dashboard, national aggregate restated weekly.

Humanitarian situation reporting. World Health Organization, Lebanon situation reports, weekly cadence. OCHA Lebanon flash updates, twice-weekly. UNICEF Lebanon situation report. United Nations Relief and Works Agency situation reports on Lebanon emergency response.

National displacement estimation. United Nations Development Programme Tensions Monitoring System (TMS) Pulse, daily national estimate including informal and host-family caseload.

Cross-border movement. International Organization for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Cross-Border Movements module, weekly observations at Lebanese-Syrian border crossing points.

Building damage assessment. Core Group, SF-LBN-DMG-2026-05, *Lebanon damage cumulative assessment 5 March to 29 April 2026*, dated 8 May 2026, including cadastre-level building-damage figures for 303 cadastres in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Dahieh. Methodology documented in annex A2 of that report. Supplementary post-ceasefire delta in SF-LBN-DMG-2026-05B dated 12 May 2026.

Israeli air-strike geography. Public Works Studio Israeli strikes feed (94 percent of records), augmented by LiveUAMap homepage scraping, Rocketalert.live API, and NASA VIIRS FIRMS thermal anomaly detections. Tier-A entries (explicit coordinates at ingestion) only.

Aid flows. OCHA Financial Tracking Service, 195 transactions since 2 March 2026. International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Datastore, 1,194 transactions across all Lebanon-tagged disbursements since 2 March 2026.

Casualties. Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, Public Health Emergency Operations Centre dashboards, 10 cumulative snapshots since 2 March 2026.

Administrative boundaries. American University of Beirut administrative boundary shapefiles, 4 admin levels (country, 8 governorates, 26 districts, 1,700-plus cadastres).

Caza-resident population baselines. Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics 2017 census, UNDP rebasing for 2024.

CORE GROUP

Date Issued: 13 May 2026

Prepared By: Core Group, Strategic Analysis Unit

ABOUT CORE GROUP

Core Group is a Beirut-based strategic foresight house. We produce decision-ready analysis and advisory for governments, diplomatic institutions, and strategic investors navigating Middle Eastern complexity. Our work integrates structured analytical products, applied strategic advisory, and analysis-informed mediation; delivered on daily and weekly cycles calibrated to the speed at which the situation changes.

We are based in Beirut. In environments where official data is systematically unreliable and remote analysis inherits every distortion in its source material, physical proximity is not a logistical convenience but an epistemological foundation of our methodology. We verify what others can only estimate.